TORTS-EMOTIONAL

DISTRESS-DIFFERING

BURDENS

OF PROOF,
BASED ON THE SEX OF THE PARENT, DETERMINE WHEN PARENTS
MAY RECOVER FOR EMOTIONAL. DISTRESS SUFFERED FROM MEDICAL MALPRACTICE WHICH CAUSES THE PREMATURE BIRTH AND

SUBSEQUENT DEATH OF THEIR CHILD-Carey v. Lovett,

132 N.J.

44, 622 A.2d 1279 (1993).
Claims for recovering damages for purely emotional distress
suffered by an individual who witnesses a traumatic, frightening, or
shocking event have not always enjoyed approval by courts in the
United States.' The common law did not view emotional tranquil1 Julie A. Davies, Direct Actions for EmotionalHarm: Is CompromisePossible , 67 WASH.
L. REV. 1, 5 (1992). Davies notes that courts "have manifested hostility toward claims
for damages for mental distress for as long as those claims have been presented by
litigants." Id.; see Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 865 (Cal. 1977) (denying recovery for loss of affection from deceased parent); Palsgraf v. Long Island
R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) (emphasizing that there is no cause of action in
negligence unless there is an invasion of a legally protected right or interest); Brooker
v. Silverthorne, 99 S.E. 350, 352 (S.C. 1919) (denying recovery to a telephone operator who became nervous and unfit to perform her job after an individual used abusive
language while speaking with her on the telephone); Kramer v. Ricksmeier, 139 N.W.
1091, 1091-92 (Iowa 1913) (denying recovery for emotional distress suffered by a woman when the defendant called the plaintiff over the phone, used violent language,
and insisted the woman take care of her absent husband's cattle); Hixson v. Slocum,
161 S.W. 520, 523 (Ky. Ct. App. 1913) (holding, in part, that mere words do not
constitute an assault and thus any harm suffered is not recoverable); Beaulieu v. Great
N. Ry., 114 N.W. 353, 354 (Minn. 1907) (holding that damages for mental suffering
can be recovered for breach of contract only in exceptional cases in which the breach
is willful); State v. Daniel, 48 S.E. 544, 545 (N.C. 1904) (denying recovery because
mere words, insults, and abusive language are not an actionable assault).
The hostility emanating from the bench regarding emotional distress claims
stemmed from the courts' "inability to evaluate evidence of causation and harm and
to award a proper quantum of compensatory damages . . . ." John David Burley,
Comment, Dillon Revisited: Toward a Better Paradigmfor Bystander Cases, 43 OHIO ST.
L.J. 931, 932 (1982). As a result of these initial judicial fears, as well as the courts'
concern for fraudulent or frivolous emotional distress claims, many courts barred
such claims. Id. at 932-33. The very nature of the emotional distress claim demanded
that it be limited. Blanche Wilkinson, Note, BystanderEmotional Distress Claims in Medical MalpracticeActions, 15 AM.J. TRIAL Avoc. 605, 605 & n.2 (1992) (quoting W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 360-61 (5th ed.
1984)). Courts considered emotional harm to be temporary and trivial, as well as
easily feigned. Id. (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra). Additionally, courts perceived it
unfair to impose "heavy and disproportionate financial burdens upon a defendant,
whose conduct was only negligent, for consequences which appear remote from the
'wrongful' act." Id. at 605 and n.2 (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra).
Due to the temporary and trivial nature of emotional harm, as well as the fear of
fraudulent claims, many courts denied the right to recover from injuries resulting
from fright. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 45 N.E. 354, 354-55 (N.Y. 1896). Justice Martin, writing for the court in Mitchell, annunciated the doctrine that absent allowing
recovery for mere fright there can be no recovery permitted for any of its consequences. Id. at 354. The justice declared that because fright itself was not an actiona-
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ity or peace of mind as capable of judicial protection.2 Indeed,
harm to the mind alone was not thought to be real, with courts

believing that assessment of monetary damages for such harm was
impossible.' The scientific community had not established the
connection between the mind and body-the connection between
emotional well-being and physical health-and as a result any physical manifestations4 accompanying emotional distress were often
ble claim, the consequences of fright, no matter how severe, equally failed to amount
to a legitimate cause of action. Id. Justice Martin explained that many consequences
of fright, such as miscarriages, blindness, and insanity, merely demonstrated the degree of fright sustained by an individual. Id.
2 See Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49
HA~v. L. REv. 1033, 1035 (1936). Magruder explained that "the common law ha[d]
been reluctant to recognize the interest in one's peace of mind as deserving of general and independent legal protection, even as against intentional invasions." Id. Magruder argued that "a certain toughening of the mental hide is a better protection
than the law could ever be." Id.
The law regarding claims for emotional injury "struggled for centuries to compensate claimants for emotional distress in proper cases while at the same time avoiding the imposition of damages (or crushing defense costs) on persons engaged in
innocent or even beneficial activities." David Crump, Evaluating Independent Torts
Based Upon "Intentional"or "Negligent" Infliction of Emotional Distress: How Can We Keep
the Baby from Dissolving in the Bath Water, 34 ARIz. L. REv. 439, 506 (1992). Another
commentator noted in her discussion on the development and future of the bystander recovery cases, that "some kinds of harm should not be compensable-that
there are some things in life people just have to learn to take, instead of rushing to
court with their complaints." ClaudiaJ. Wrazel, Note, Limiting Liabilityfor the Negligent
Infliction of EmotionalDistress: The "BystanderRecovery" Cases, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 847, 850
(1981); see also Magruder, supra, at 1033-36 (discussing the common law's reluctance
to recognize an interest in an individual's peace of mind).
3 Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 605 & n.2 (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at
360-61) (quoting limitations placed on emotional distress claims)). Claims for the
recovery of damages resulting from the infliction of emotional distress were often
barred due to the "'speculative' nature of mental or emotional distress." G. EDwARD
WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA, AN INTELLEcruAL HIsToRy

103 (1980). Discussing the

historic rationale for limiting recovery, White explained that the term "speculative"
referred to the belief that emotional illness was difficult to diagnose and therefore
easy to feign. Id. As a result of this characterization of emotional distress, White
maintained that society was not confident in its ability to evaluate emotional illness
apart from diagnosing those physical manifestations that often accompanied such illness. Id. Additionally, White surmised that this characterization of emotional illness
would lead to the belief that emotional injuries are less serious than physical injuries.
Id.; see generallyWilliam Prosser, Insult and Outrage,44 CAL. L. REv. 40, 41 (1956) (tracing the history of emotional distress claims and the damages associated with such
claims).
4 Common examples of the physical manifestations that accompany emotional
distress include:
(1) anxiety responses-reactions characterized by anxiety and nervousness, gastrointestinal symptoms, cardiovascular symptoms, genito-urinary symptoms, fatigue, weakness, headaches and backaches; (2)
conversion responses-emotional reactions translated into physical ailments such as paralysis and limited use of limbs of the body; and (3)
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believed to be feigned.5 Additionally, the courts were not willing to
expand the scope of one person's duty6 to another by insisting that
an individual exercise due care not only to prevent unreasonable
risk of physical harm, but also to prevent placing a witnessing third
party at risk of emotional harm.7
hypochondrial reactions-attitudinal changes unaccompanied by physical symptoms and characterized by an obsessive concern for one's own
health.
Burley, supra note 1, at 940 (citing Laughlin, The Neuroses Following Trauma, 6 TRAuMATIC MED. AND SURGERY FOR THE ATr'y § 1301, at 104-08 (1962)).
5 ARCHIBALD H. THROCKMORTON, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS, Damages
for Fright, 303, 315 (1924) (quoting Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 45 N.E. 354, 354 (N.Y.
1896)). In Mitchell, the plaintiff was standing on the sidewalk when the defendant's
negligently driven horse car raced toward the plaintiff. Mitchell, 45 N.E. at 354. The
plaintiff stood between the horses and was so frightened that she became unconscious. Id. The plaintiff suffered from mental shock and sustained a miscarriage. Id.
at 354-55. The court held that the plaintiff was neither permitted to recover for her
mere fright nor for the consequences of her fright (i.e., the miscarriage) because she
sustained no physical impact. Id. at 355. The court noted that the assessment of
damages would "rest upon mere conjecture or speculation." Id. The court further
opined that to open the door to this class of litigants would be contrary to public
policy. Id. The Mitchell court forewarned that litigants would feign injuries and bring
fictitious claims in which an assessment of damages would be based on pure speculation. Id. at 354-55.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania mirrored the feelings of the New York court,
calling any expansion of recovery for such speculative claims an unhealthy growth.
Huston v. Borough of Freemansburg, 61 A. 1022, 1023 (Pa. 1905). Judge Mitchell,
commenting on this unhealthy growth, noted that the expansion of the negligence
cause of action was the result of crafty attorneys encouraged by clients and rewarded
by the prejudices ofjuries. Id Judge Mitchell stated that this expansion had reached
its greatest plateau when it "stretched to the effort to cover so intangible, so untrustworthy, so illusory, and so speculative a cause of action as mere mental disturbance."
Id.; see generally THROCKMORTON, supra, at 314-17 (discussing damages for fright).
6 The general duty standard in negligence cases is "one of reasonable care under
the circumstances." JAMES A. HENDERSON,JR. & RICHARD N. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 335 (1988). The standard of care that all individuals owe to one another to avoid
negligent acts is one that can be met "by something less than superhuman efforts."
Id. The standard of care is therefore an objective one. Id.; see also KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 1, § 53, at 356-59 (discussing the standards of duty in negligence actions).
Prosser and Keeton defined duty as "a question of whether the defendant is under
any obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff .... " Id. at 356. The general
standard of care that all individuals must adhere to in negligence cases is "the legal
standard of reasonable conduct in light of the apparent risk." Id. Discussing the development of the concept of duty, Prosser and Keeton noted:
[T] he courts developed the idea of duty as a matter of some specific
relation between the plaintiff and the defendant, without which there
could be no liability .... The rule which developed out of [this] was
that no action could be founded upon the breach of a duty owed only
to some person other than the plaintiff.
Id. at 357 (footnote omitted). The scope of this duty has been difficult for the courts
to define because of the desire to avoid imposing excessive punishment upon a negligent defendant. Id. at 360-61.
7 See, e.g., THROCKMORTON, supra note 5, at 311-12 (quoting Ward v. WestJersey &
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Individuals, however, were able to recover damages for fright
suffered while witnessing a negligent act, so long as the bystander"
also sustained injury from a physical impact.9 The requirement of
Seashore R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 385, 47 A. 561, 562 (1900)). The Ward court rejected
the right to recover damages that resulted from harm suffered from emotional distress absent impact. Ward, 65 N.J.L. at 385, 47 A. at 562. The court explained that a
person is liable only for the "naturaland proximate results of his negligent act" and
because physical harm is not the natural consequence of fright "in the case of a person of ordinary physical and mental vigor," imposing liability would result in unfairness. Id.; see infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Ward
case.
Furthermore, the judiciary feared that allowing such recovery would "increase
exponentially the liability of negligent defendants . . . ." Davies, supra note 1, at 16
(citation omitted). The result of such a massive growth in liability, some believed,
would result in extending the liability of the defendant to a point that "far outweigh[ed] the defendants' culpability and society's ability to pay." Id. (citation omitted); see also Burley, supra note 1, at 932-33 (discussing the development of the
bystander emotional distress claim in California courts and the shortcomings of the
Dillon v. Leg approach to bystander recovery). As the concept of liability began to
expand to include areas of emotional distress, legal scholars posed certain questions:
[W] hat criteria were to govern recovery in marginal cases; what were the
limits in potential recovery for emotional damage; was negligently inflicted emotional distress to receive protection comparable to that afforded to intentionally inflicted emotional harm; was emotional distress
to be limited to fear for oneself and, if not, what third-party relationships were to be recognized.
White, supra note 3, at 106.
8 Bystander is defined as "one present but not taking part: a chance spectator."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICrIONARY 307 (1961).
9 See, e.g., Bosley v. Andrews, 142 A.2d 263, 263-67

(Pa. 1958) (denying recovery to
plaintiff, who suffered fright and shock when chased by defendant's bull, because she
had sustained no physical impact from the bull); Brisboise v. Kansas City Pub. Serv.
Co., 303 S.W.2d 619, 626-27 (Mo. 1957) (denying recovery to a husband for loss of
consortium when his wife suffered fright and shock when a negligently driven car
swerved toward her but did not hit her); Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 47 N.E. 88, 89
(Mass. 1897) (noting that "a carrier of passengers is not bound to anticipate or to
guard against an injurious result which would only happen to a person of peculiar
sensitiveness"); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 45 N.E. 354, 354-55 (N.Y. 1896) (denying
recovery to plaintiff who suffered fright and a miscarriage when a negligently driven
horse carriage approached her but did not make contact with her). The impact cases
allowed a bystander to recover for emotional harm suffered under limited circumstances. Wilkinson, supranote 1, at 608. "[T] he bystander who observes an injury to a
third person must also sustain some physical injury from the same force that injured
the third person." Id. Thus, "[t]he impact rule was the first standard adopted that
recognized the merit of emotional distress and avoided unlimited liability." Burley,
supra note 1, at 933. This standard represented the accepted standard in the early
20th Century. Id.
The development of the claims for emotional distress in England, Scotland, and
Ireland moved away from the physical impact requirement much earlier, and embraced a right to recover for emotional distress damages absent any physical impact.
THROCKMORTON, supra note 5, at 306. As Throckmorton pointed out, the development of recovery of emotional distress absent physical impact enjoyed a brief hurrah
in the United States, as exemplified in Hill v. Kimball Id at 306 (citing Hill v. Kim-
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physical impact was meant to ensure that the harm suffered was
real.10 The courts later viewed this limitation on liability as arbitrary because the limitation allowed individuals, who could potentially feign distress, to recover even when they sustained only slight
impact.1 1 The limitation, however, also denied recovery to a person who suffered real emotional harm absent any physical
impact. 12
As a result of these inconsistencies" and the advances made by
the scientific community"4 regarding the connections between the
ball, 13 S.W. 59, 59 (Tex. 1890)). In Hil4 the Supreme Court of Texas held that a
woman could recover for the emotional distress suffered which caused a miscarriage,
notwithstanding the fact that the woman had sustained no physical impact. Hil 13
S.W. at 59. Cases following Hil4 however, did not follow suit. See supra note 1 for a
discussion of the cases following Hill which maintained the impact rule requirement.
One narrow exception persisted in the United States, however, and allowed recovery for emotional harm absent physical impact in cases involving the negligent
transmission of telegraphic messages. HENDERSON & PFrARSON, supra note 6, at 575
n.156; see, e.g., Russ v. Western Union Tel. Co., 23 S.E.2d 681, 682 (N.C. 1943) (allowing recovery for emotional distress resulting from the negligent transmission of
telegraphic messages).
10 Burley, supra note 1, at 933. A physical impact requirement, one commentator
noted, would insure the genuineness of claims because, while fright is difficult to
measure, damages are more easily measured when they are the result of physical pain
or injuries. Id.
11 Id.
12 See WHrrE,

supra note 3, at 103-04. Another commentator identified some of the
fictions employed by courts in the United States that allowed recovery of claims
"where defendants had committed trivial 'impacts' or 'trespasses,' but deni[ed] recovery where none existed." Id. at 105 (citations omitted). Trivial impacts included, for
example, a slight blow, a trifling burn, an electric shock, a trivial jolt or jar, a forcible
seating on the floor, dust in the eye, or inhalation of smoke. KEETON ET AL., supra
note 1, at 363-64 (citations omitted). As a result of these fictions, many courts relaxed
the physical impact rule, realizing that the "presence or absence of a minor physical
impact was irrelevant.. . ." Wrazel, supra note 2, at 850. The presence or absence of
a minor impact was not determinative of whether and to what extent the plaintiff
suffered harm. Id.
13 See Wrazel, supra note 2, at 849. One commentator noted that the impact rule
did not succeed as an effective limit to frivolous or fraudulent claims because plaintiffs devised interpretations of the rule whereby the slightest physical impact would
be sufficient to bring a bystander recovery case into court. Id.
14 See id. at 854 (citations omitted). The scientific community was now equipped
to discern and distinguish real from feigned emotional distress. Id.; see generally Herbert F. Goodrich, Emotional Disturbanceas Legal Damage, 20 MicH. L. REv. 497, 497-99
(1922) (discussing in part the advancements and experiments of Dr. Walter B. Cannon, professor of physiology at Harvard, and Dr. George W. Crile, professor of surgery at Western Reserve and visiting surgeon at Lakeside Hospital, Cleveland,
regarding emotional distress and its effect on human beings). Professors Cannon and
Crile stated that the development of medical science in the area of psychic injuries
elevated the problems of proof associated with mental distress. Id. at 498. Furthermore, the two professors explained, "[i]f the physical effect of strong emotional disturbance is a result that ... can [be] trace[d] and can [be] see[n], it should be clear
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mind and the body, many courts began to depart from the impact
requirement.1 5 Instead, courts allowed recovery for emotional distress sustained by an individual who was within a "zone of danger"
of a physical impact. 6 In such circumstances, an individual was
awarded damages for the emotional distress that resulted from the
fear accompanying the threat of physical injury.1 7 The right to recover for the emotional harm suffered no longer depended upon
impact, but rather focused on the individual's presence within the
18
zone of danger.
Similar to the impact requirement before it, the zone of danthat the plaintiff's right to recover for such disturbance should be recognized." Id. at
503.
Other commentators similarly acknowledged the validity of emotional harm, noting that "'mental' suffering [i]s no less real, or susceptible of 'scientific' understanding, than physical suffering." WHrrE, supra note 3, at 104 (citations omitted). One
author noted, "[t]he 'speculative' nature of emotional injuries ha[s] been purportedly eliminated by the insights of the behavioral sciences." Id. at 105.
15 See Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 609-13. The creation of the zone of danger rule
was ajudicial response to the "harsh result of the physical impact rule...." Id. at 609.
See infra notes 16-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the zone of danger
recovery standard and infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
New Jersey zone of danger recovery cases.
16 See Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 553 (Minn. 1980) (denying recovery to
parents who witnessed their child being struck by a car because they were not within a
zone of danger, and thus not reasonably in fear for their lives); Vaillancourt v. Medical Ctr. Hosp. of Vt., Inc., 425 A.2d 92, 93, 95 (Vt. 1980) (allowing recovery to a
mother when a physician and hospital negligently inflicted harm upon her fetus, placing her within the zone of danger, but denying recovery to the father who was not
within the zone of danger when the physician and hospital negligently inflicted harm
upon the fetus); Keck v.Jackson, 593 P.2d 671, 672-77 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) permitting plaintiff to recover for emotional distress suffered while witnessing an automobile
accident in which the plaintiff's mother died). See generally P. G. Guthrie, Annotation,
Right to Recover Damages in Negligence for Fear of Injury to Another, or Shock or Mental
Anguish at Witnessing Such Injury, 29 A.L.R.3d 1337 (1970) (discussing states which
have adopted the zone of danger rule). The zone of danger rule rested on the assumption that in bystander recovery cases, it was the fear for one's own safety which
caused the emotional distress, not the reaction to another's injury. Burley, supra note
1, at 934. The courts created the zone of danger rule to decrease the "arbitrariness of
the impact rule by simply removing one of the barriers-actual impact .. " Wrazel,
supra note 2, at 852.
Notwithstanding the attempt to create a more fair and workable rule, the impact
rule and the zone of danger rule shared a significant parallel. Id. at 849-50. The
impact rule required that the plaintiff sustain a physical impact resulting from the
defendant's negligence, while the zone of danger rule allowed recovery if the plaintiff
could demonstrate fear of physical impact. Id.
17 Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 610.
18 Davies, supra note 1, at 22. The courts believed the duty, under this standard, to
be successfully restricted because it did not extend liability to an "unlimited chain of
people affected by the defendant's negligence .... " Id. at 21. The obligation would
be extended only to those whom the defendant already owed a duty to avoid the
negligent infliction of physical harm. Id.
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ger rule developed to ensure the genuineness of the harm suffered, maintaining that an individual was more likely to experience
genuine emotional distress if he or she not only witnessed the injury to the third party, but also was in danger of physical harm.19
This limitation, however, proved to be as arbitrary as the physical
impact rule. 20 The zone of danger rule based recovery on the
proximity of the plaintiff to the impact of negligence. 21 Thus, the
rule worked to deny recovery to individuals who suffered harm absent physical danger.22
In 1968, however, the California judiciary embraced a new
"guideline approach" to bystander recovery cases.23 Under the
19 Wrazel, supra note 2, at 852. Although the zone of danger rule did not entirely
prevent fraudulent claims, it did reduce the number of such claims. Id. This reduction in the number of fraudulent claims was due in part to the concept of zone of
danger as an "area in which a person is likely to be close enough to the source of
danger to fear harm to himself." Id. Defining the parameters of this zone as the area
in which a person is both close to the source of danger to fear harm to himself and to
witness harm to another ensured the genuineness of claims. Id.
20 Id. at 853 (quoting Stuart B. Eiche, Comment, The Common Law Treatment in
Wisconsin of the Right to Recoverfor Emotional Harm, 4 Wis. L. REv. 1089, 1109-10 (1978))
(noting that the zone of danger rule is no different than the outdated impact
requirement).
21 Davies, supra note 1, at 22. Criticizing the zone of danger rule, one commentator noted that it subdivides foreseeable plaintiffs according to their relative proximity
to the point of impact, a distinction that may be unrelated to the injury sustained. Id.
This arbitrary distinction prevents the court from compensating foreseeable victims of
negligence. Id. Davies, however, disagreed with the criticism advanced above against
the zone of danger rule, and explained that proximity to the danger or point of impact was indeed relevant for bystander recovery because it indicated the "degree of
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant." Id. at 23 n.107.
22 Id. at 22-23. The principle criticism of the zone of danger rule is its potential to
deny recovery to those who suffer real harm but are in no risk of physical danger. Id.
23 See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 914 (Cal. 1968). In Dillon, the Supreme Court
of California defined the guideline approach and observed that "often the real source
of harm was not fear of personal harm, but fear of harm to a third party." Wrazel,
supra note 2, at 856. The guideline approach "increased judicial flexibility in allowing
recovery, thereby expanding the opportunities for redress of such harms." Id. As a
result, some states regarded Dillon as a landmark decision in the area of emotional
distress. Id.
Dillon involved a mother and sister who witnessed a negligent driver run over
their daughter/sister, ultimately causing her death. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 914. The sister
of the victim was also in danger of being hit by the car. Id. The mother was a few
inches away, but was not in any danger of being hit. Id. The Dillon court allowed the
mother, as well as the sister, to recover damages for emotional distress suffered upon
witnessing the event, notwithstanding the fact that the mother was in no danger of
being injured. Id. at 925. The court noted that a contrary ruling would have permitted recovery to the sister who was within the zone of danger, and deny recovery to the
mother who witnessed the event but was a short distance outside of the zone. Id. at
915. The Dillon court commented that because the impact requirement had been
eliminated, so too must the presence within a zone of danger requirement. Id. The
court explained that the reason for the presence within the zone of danger rule was
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guideline approach, a plaintiff could recover for emotional distress
suffered as a result of witnessing injury to a third party provided he
or she could establish certain factors.24 Likewise, the New Jersey
courts have followed a similar path of development regarding emotional distress claims, beginning with the early impact cases to the
zone of danger rule, and finally to adopting a model for bystander
recovery.2 5 The NewJersey courts continue to define whether, and
that "one within it will fear the danger of impact." Id. Because impact was no longer
required to sustain a cause of action, neither was the fear of that impact. Id.
The Dillon court identified three factors to consider to determine whether the
right of the bystander to recover for emotional distress attaches. Id. at 920. These
factors, the Dillon court noted, include: (1) the plaintiff's close proximity to the accident; (2) whether the shock which the plaintiff suffered resulted as a direct consequence of witnessing the traumatic event; and (3) whether the plaintiff and the
injured party were closely related. Id. The court determined that the mother, who
witnessed her child being struck by a car and subsequently die, met these factors. Id.
at 921.
24 See supra note 23 for a discussion of the Dillon factors required to recover on a
claim of emotional distress; see also Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30 (Cal.
1989) (redefining the Dillon factors necessary for recovery of emotional distress as
elements, and thus denying recovery to plaintiff because she failed to meet the observation requirement-she heard a car accident and later discovered it was her son);
Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1, 3-4, 9 (Cal. 1985) (allowing a mother to recover
for emotional distress suffered from witnessing the deterioration of her son while
incarcerated in a juvenile detention facility that did not provide adequate medical
care).
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436, there exists a cause of action
for emotional harm suffered when a person witnesses a negligent act. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 436(2),(3) (1965). Specifically, the Restatement provides in
pertinent part:
(2) If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk
of causing bodily harm to another otherwise than by subjecting him to
fright, shock, or other similar and immediate emotional disturbance,
the fact that such harm results solely from the internal operation of
fright or other emotional disturbance does not protect the actor from
liability.
(3) The rule stated in Subsection (2) applies where the bodily harm to
the other results from his shock or fright at harm or peril to a member
of his immediate family occurring in his presence.
Id.
As in Dillon, the Restatement suggests that recovery will be allowed if one witnessed an injury to a member of a person's immediate family. Id. at § 436(2). The
comment to the Restatement, however, suggests that bystander recovery is not as liberal or flexible as that defined in Dillon. Id. at § 436(3) cmt. f. The Restatement
explains the rationale for allowing recovery of emotional distress for the bystander as
follows: "The defendant, by his negligence, has endangered the plaintiff s own safety
and threatened him with bodily harm, so that the defendant is in breach of an original duty to the plaintiff to exercise care for his protection." Id. This comment suggests that presence within the zone of danger may still be required for recovery. Id.
25 See, e.g., Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 91, 101, 417 A.2d 521, 522-23, 528 (1980)
(allowing recovery of emotional distress by a mother who witnessed her son being
trapped in an elevator shaft and die during attempts to rescue him); Falzone v. Busch,
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under what circumstances, claims for emotional distress may be
brought and by whom.2 6 One area of particular concern to the
courts is the category under which emotional distress claims stemming from medical malpractice may be advanced.2 7
In a recent case, Carey v. Lovett,28 the New Jersey Supreme
Court resolved the issue of when parents can recover for a claim of
emotional distress that results from a medical malpractice involving their child.2 9 Specifically, the court held that parents could
maintain an action for emotional distress where medical malpractice resulted in the premature birth and subsequent death of their
baby, so long as each parent satisfied a standard for recovery.3
The court declared, however, that the standard which the father
from the standard
would have to satisfy in order to recover 3differed
1
recover.
could
mother
the
which
under
In the summer of 1983,JoAnn Carey, plaintiff, began her third
pregnancy within four years.3 2 Mrs. Carey suffered from diabetes
mellitus type I,3 3 and in the twenty-sixth week of her pregnancy
45 N.J. 559, 563, 214 A.2d 12, 14 (1965) (holding that physical impact was no longer a
prerequisite to recovery); Ward v. West Jersey & Seashore R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 384, 47
A. 561, 561 (1900) (holding that impact was a prerequisite for recovery of emotional
distress); Eyrich for Eyrich v. Dam, 193 N.J. Super. 244, 247, 261, 473 A.2d 539, 54041, 548 (App. Div. 1984) (allowing recovery for emotional distress suffered by an individual who witnessed five year-old neighbor, for whom he was a father figure, mauled
by circus leopard), certif. denied, 97 N.J. 583, 483 A.2d 127 (1984).
26 See infra notes 27 and 56-111 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
development of claims for emotional distress in New Jersey courts.
27 See, e.g., Frame v. Kothari, 115 N.J. 638, 650, 560 A.2d'675, 681 (1989) (discussing the characterization of parents' claim for emotional distress, caused by the misdiagnosis of their son's condition which lead to his death, as an indirect claim for
which the court denied recovery); Giardina v. Bennett, 111 N.J. 412, 413, 545 A.2d
139, 139 (1988) (characterizing as a direct claim parents' action for emotional distress
resulting from the stillbirth of their child caused by medical malpractice); Strachan v.
John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., 109 N.J. 523, 526-28, 538, 538 A.2d 346, 347-48, 353
(1988) (allowing parents to recover, as a direct claim, for emotional harm suffered as
a result of a hospital's negligence in handling their son's body after he committed
suicide).
28 132 N.J. 44, 622 A.2d 1279 (1993).
29 Id. at 55, 622 A.2d at 1284.
30 Id. at 62, 622 A.2d at 1288. See infra notes 127-39 and accompanying text for a
detailed discussion of the requisite standards.
31 Carey, 132 N.J. at 62, 622 A.2d at 1284.
32 Id. at 50, 622 A.2d at 1282.
33 Id. Diabetes Mellitus is defined as "[a] syndrome resulting from a variable interaction of hereditary and environmental factors, and characterized by abnormal insulin secretion, inappropriately elevated blood glucose levels, and a variety of end organ
complications including nephropathy, retinopathy, neuropathy, and accelerated atherosclerosis." THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 1069 (Robert Berkow,
M.D., ed., 15th ed. 1987) [hereinafter MERCK MANUAL]. According to the Merck Manual individuals who are considered part of the insulin dependant diabetes mellitus,
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experienced an increase in her blood sugar level. 34 Mrs. Carey,
therefore, increased her dosage of insulin to counter her elevated
blood sugar level, and unsuccessfully tried to contact her internist 5 Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Carey admitted herself to West
Jersey Hospital where an internist diagnosed Mrs. Carey as suffering from ketoacidosis, a condition that often results in intrauterine
death.3 6 Mrs. Carey experienced contractions, but after repeated
3 7
attempts the physician was unable to discover a fetal heart rate.
The hospital phoned Mrs. Carey's obstetrician-gynecologist, Dr.
Lovett, who made a diagnosis over the telephone of fetal death. 8
Throughout this entire process, Mrs. Carey insisted that her baby
was alive and that she felt the baby moving.39
or IDDM-Type I, are those individuals "who are literally dependant on exogenous
insulin to prevent ketoacidosis and death." Id. IDDM, the manual noted, is "associated with certain histocompatibility antigens (HLA) on chromosome 6, with autoimmunity directed against the islet, and possibly with a predisposition to viral
infections." Id. The manual added that "[v]iruses of several types are some of the
environmental agents that may induce IDDM in genetically susceptible persons, perhaps involving cell-mediated immune mechanisms." Id.
During the course of this disease, Mrs. Carey suffered from two incidents of
ketoacidosis. Carey, 132 N.J. at 50, 622 A.2d at 1282. Ketoacidosis, the court articulated, is a condition that results in a dangerous elevation in the body's level of acid.
Id. Diabetic ketoacidosis is a condition that "results from the absence of effective
insulin, which causes hyperglycemia, ketonuria, dehydration, and acidosis. Glucose
no longer enters muscle cells, and fat is metabolized to produce energy. Free fatty
acids are converted to ketone bodies in the liver. The ketone bodies are organic acids
that cause metabolic acidosis." MANUAL OF NURSING PRAcrICE 706 (4th ed. 1986).
Mrs. Carey had suffered complications during a previous pregnancy because of her
diabetic condition. Carey, 132 N.J. at 50, 622 A.2d at 1282. Mrs. Carey's first child,
Annette, was born a month premature and suffered from toxemia. Id. In 1983, Mrs.
Carey's second pregnancy ended in miscarriage. Id.
34 Carey, 132 N.J. at 50, 622 A.2d at 1282.
35 Id. Mrs. Carey suffered from shortness of breath, fatigue, and an elevated blood
sugar level. Id. Mrs. Carey telephoned her internist, Dr. Osler, several times but was
unable to reach him. Id. At ten o'clock that evening, Dr. Osler finally returned her
call. Id. At trial, Dr. Osler claimed that he advised Mrs. Carey to get to the hospital
immediately, while Mrs. Carey claimed the doctor advised her not to go to the hospital until morning. Id. at 50-51, 622 A.2d at 1282.
36 Id. at 51, 622 A.2d at 1282; see supra note 33 for a discussion of ketoacidosis.
37 Carey, 132 N.J. at 51, 622 A.2d at 1283.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 52, 622 A.2d at 1283. Although Mrs. Carey's labor continued to advance,
no one attempted to stop the onset of delivery. Id. The nurses monitoring Mrs. Carey's condition attempted on several occasions to find a fetal heart rate through the
use of a transducer and a doppler. Id. The nurses again conferred with Dr. Lovett
over the telephone, at which time he ordered the injection of labor inducing drugs
including pitocin. Id. at 52-53, 622 A.2d at 1283.
Pitocin "[c] auses potent and selective stimulation of uterine and mammary gland
smooth muscle." NURSING 89 DRUG HANDBOOK 849 (1987). The Handbook noted
that pitocin is "[u]sed to induce or reinforce labor only when [the] pelvis is known to
be adequate, when vaginal delivery is indicated, when fetal maturity is assured, and
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Without assistance from doctors or nurses, Mrs. Carey later delivered a baby girl in a breach position.4" Although the parents
and nurses believed the baby was a stillborn, a nurse later discovered that the child was in fact alive.4" Due to severe complications
resulting from the unassisted birth, a doctor placed the child on a
life support system.4 2 The Careys elected to disconnect the life support system, and the child died.4"
As a result of their child's death, the Careys brought a malpractice action for emotional distress against medical personnel,
44
hospital administrators, and the manufacturers of fetal monitors.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, held that the Careys
could allege a direct claim for the emotional harm they suffered.4 5
The court maintained that medical malpractice that causes a stillborn is a direct injury not only to the expectant mother and her
when [the] fetal position is favorable... [and] [s]hould be used only in [a] hospital
where critical-care facilities and doctor are immediately available." Id. at 850. Some
of the adverse reactions to the use of pitocin include an "increased postpartum bleeding .... convulsions or coma resultingfrom water intoxication[,] . . .increased heart rate,
... nausea, vomiting[,] . .. impaired uterine bloodflow, and increased uterine motility." Id.

Dr. Lovett did not seem to respond to Mrs. Carey's insistence that her baby was
alive. Carey, 132 N.J. at 52, 622 A.2d at 1283. He did not examine her in person, but
merely continued to diagnose fetal death over the telephone. Id.
Authors Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English explored the gender politics
that have long accompanied the medical treatment of women by male doctors in a
book entitied, ForHer Own Good, BARBARA EHRENREICH & DEIRDRE ENGLISH, FOR HER
OwN GOOD (1978). The authors describe the plight of one victim of the male dominated medical profession, Charlotte Perking Gilman. Id. at 101-02. Due to a nervous
disorder, Mrs. Gilman collapsed and sought the care of "'the greatest nerve specialist
in the country,'" Dr. S. Weir Mitchell. Id. at 101. In preparation for her visit to Dr.
Mitchell, Mrs. Gilman painstakingly transcribed a complete history of her illness. Id.
The information she compiled for the doctor to review was dismissed by the doctor as
evidence of self-conceit. Id. Dr. Mitchell did not want any information from his
patients, but rather insisted on complete obedience. Id. at 101-02. Similarly, Dr.
Lovett did not want to consider the information provided by Mrs. Carey-specifically
that she believed her baby was still alive-and refused to alter his diagnosis. Carey,
132 N.J. at 52, 622 A.2d at 1283.
40 Carey, 132 N.J. at 53, 622 A.2d at 1283. After Mrs. Carey delivered the baby, the
fetus fell unsupported to the bed. Id. The child was not the usual color of a stillborn,
but instead was pinkish in color. Id., 622 A.2d at 1283-84. The Careys and the attendant nurses believed, however, that the baby was a stillborn. Id., 622 A.2d at 1284.
41 Id. After another hospital physician helped Mrs. Carey deliver the placenta, Dr.
Lovett arrived at the hospital. Id. at 54, 622 A.2d at 1284. After a delay of three
minutes, a neonatologist received a call to examine the baby. Id. The Careys were
informed that the child was alive. Id. The child was later transferred to the Children's Hospital in Philadelphia, where she was diagnosed as suffering from severe
brain hemorrhaging. Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at
45 Id. at

55, 622 A.2d at 1284.
49, 622 A.2d at 1281-82.
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child, but also to the expectant father. 46 Accordingly, the court
awarded $1,000,000 to the mother and $500,000 to the father for
the emotional distress suffered due to the malpractice and ultimate
death of their daughter.4 7
Reversing, the appellate division held that the Careys' claim
for emotional distress could not be considered a direct claim.4 8
The appellate court pronounced that the Careys had to advance
their cause of action as an indirect claim. 49 Because the circumstances surrounding the Careys' claim did not meet the criteria for
an indirect claim, the court dismissed their emotional distress
claim.5 ° Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the lower
court for a trial on liability and damages. 1 The New Jersey
Supreme Court subsequently granted the Careys' petition for
certification.5 2
The Supreme Court, reversing the appellate court's decision,
concluded that Mr. and Mrs. Carey could sustain their claims for
emotional distress.5 3 Specifically, the court held that for a mother
to recover, she must demonstrate only that she suffered severe
46 Id. The Carey court relied on Giardinav. Bennett to reach its decision. Id. (citing
Giardina v. Bennett, 111 NJ. 412, 545 A.2d 139 (1988)). In Giardina,the NewJersey
Supreme Court stressed that "[elven without any permanent physical harm, the
mother suffers severe and genuine injuries in the form of emotional distress and
mental anguish .... " Giardina,111 N.J. at 415, 545 A.2d at 140. The court added that
"[t]he essence of the injuries that arise from this kind of tort inheres in family relationships." Id. For a further discussion of Giardina,see infra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
47 Carey, 132 N.J. at 49, 622 A.2d at 1282.
48 Id. (citation omitted).
49 Id. (citation omitted). The court also relied on its judgment in Frame v. Kothari.
Id., 132 N.J. at 49, 622 A.2d at 1282 (citing Frame v. Kothari, 115 NJ. 638, 560 A.2d
675 (1989)). The basis for the emotional distress claim in Frame stemmed from a
doctor's misdiagnosis of a 10 month-old patient who had suffered a head injury.
Frame, 115 N.J. at 640-41, 560 A.2d at 676-77. The court held that a misdiagnosis does
not often result in the type of traumatic scene required for recovery for emotional
distress. Id. at 647-48, 560 A.2d at 680. Although the Frame court denied recovery for
emotional distress suffered by the child's parents because they failed to satisfy the
observation requirement, the court left open the door for allowing recovery in cases
in which the effects of medical malpractice are observed and an immediate connection can be made between the malpractice and the subsequent injury. Id. at 649, 560
A.2d at 681. For a further discussion of Frame, see infra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
50 Carey, 132 N.J. at 49, 622 A.2d at 1281 (citation omitted). In addition, the appellate court found the awards for both the pain and suffering and wrongful death of the
infant to be excessive. Id. (citation omitted). The law division awarded $550,000 to
the Carey child for pain and suffering and $450,000 for her wrongful death. Id. (citation omitted).
51 Id. (citation omitted).
52 Carey v. Lovett, 127 N.J. 553, 606 A.2d 366 (1991).
53 Carry, 132 N.J. at 49, 622 A.2d at 1281.
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emotional distress.5 4 The court indicated that a father, however,
does not benefit from the mother's relaxed standard of proof, and
must demonstrate that: (1) the emotional distress was severe; (2)
he witnessed both the malpractice and the effects of such malpractice; and (3) he was also shocked by the event.5 5
Originally, NewJersey courts permitted recovery for emotional
distress only when plaintiffs suffering such distress also experienced a physical impact from a negligent act. 56 For example, in
Ward v. West Jersey & Seashore Railroad Co.,5 7 the plaintiff suffered
emotional distress and fright when he became trapped on a railroad crossing as the railroad gate-keeper lowered the gates.5 8 The
court held that the plaintiff could not recover for the emotional
distress suffered from the fear of being hit by an oncoming train
because he did not sustain any physical impact from the train. 9
The Ward court explained that a contrary result would open the
flood gates to endless litigation regarding speculative emotional
distress claims.60
54

Id. at 62, 622 A.2d at 1288. The court noted that emotional distress is distress

that results in "physical manifestations or that .

.

. destroy[s] .

.

. basic emotional

security." Id. The standard of proof for mothers demonstrated a departure by the
court from previously rigid categories of direct claims and bystander claims. Id. at 60,
622 A.2d at 1287. Justice Pollock, writing for the majority, noted that, "[t]he characterization of a claim as 'direct' or 'indirect'... should not predetermine the rights of

the parties.... More important than the characterizations are the principles underlying them." Id. at 57, 622 A.2d at 1286. The court suggested that these categories, at
least with regard to the claims of mothers for emotional distress, were unimportant.
Id.
55 Id. at 60-61, 622 A.2d at 1287-88; see also Stephanie B. Goldberg, New Jersey Looks
at Infant Injuries, 79 A.B.A.J. 86 (July 1993).
56 See, e.g., Ward v. WestJersey & Seashore R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 384, 47 A. 561, 561
(1900). See also supra notes 7 and 9-15 and accompanying text for an explanation of
the development of impact cases and the claim for recovery of emotional distress.
57 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 A. 561 (1900).

Id.
59 Id. at 384, 47 A. at 561. The Ward court reasoned that liability attaches only to
"the natural and proximate results of lthe] negligent act." Id. at 385, 47 A. at 562.
Because physical suffering is not the natural result of fright, the court noted, liability
is not appropriate for mere fright. Id. The court, however, recognized that if physical
injury is demonstrated, a jury is permitted to consider the mental agitation of the
plaintiff when assessing damages. Id. at 386, 47 A. at 562; see also THROCKMORTON,
supra note 5, at 311-12 (discussing Ward and principles of non-liability for emotional
harm because such harm is not the natural or proximate result of the negligent act).
60 Ward, 65 N.J.L. at 386, 47 A. at 562. The court explained that "[i]f the right of
recovery in this class of cases should be once established, it would naturally result in a
flood of litigations, in cases where the injury complained of may be easily feigned
without detection, and where the damages must rest upon mere conjecture and speculation." Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 45 N.E. 354, 354-55 (N.Y. 1896)). In
Mitche4 the New York Court of Appeals held that recovery of damages for a miscarriage suffered by the plaintiff as a result of fright, caused by the dangerous operation
58
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Over sixty years later, the NewJersey Supreme Court departed
from the physical impact requirement.6 1 In Falzone v. Busch,62 the
court held that a plaintiff could recover for emotional distress
stemming from a fear of sudden personal injury, provided such distress was severe enough to have resulted in considerable bodily injury or sickness.6 3 The Fahone court determined that the plaintiff
could recover, not only for the distress suffered due to the fear of
being hit by the defendant's car, but also for the injuries caused by
the emotional distress sustained as a result of witnessing a car strike
her husband.6" In abandoning the impact rule and its rationale,
the court refuted the reasons identified
by the Ward court in sup65
requirement.
impact
the
of
port
First, the Falzone court explained that the concern over
whether a person was likely to suffer physical injuries from emotional distress could no longer be seriously challenged due to the
steadily expanding medical knowledge regarding the relationship
of a horse carriage, was not cognizable because the plaintiff had not sustained any
physical injuries. Mitchell, 45 N.E. at 354.
61 See Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 563, 214 A.2d 12, 14 (1965).
62

Id.

Id. at 569, 214 A.2d at 17.
Id. at 561, 570, 214 A.2d at 13, 18. In Fazone, the plaintiff was seated in a parked
car when the defendant, driving negligently, swerved across the roadway and headed
directly for the plaintiffs car. Id. The plaintiff witnessed her husband being struck by
the defendant's car and was herself in danger of being struck. Id.
Many commentators have called the rule under which Mrs. Falzone was permitted to recover the zone of danger rule. Joseph J. Kelleher, Note, An Attorney's Liability
for the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 58 FoRDHAm L. Rxv. 1309, 1314 (1990).
To recover under the zone of danger rule, the plaintiff must have been in an area
where he or she witnessed severe injury or death to a family member and, at the same
time, have been in risk of suffering physical harm. Id. Many states have adopted this
rule to allow recovery for emotional distress claims. See supra note 16 for a discussion
of cases adopting this rule. See generally Guthrie, supra note 16 (discussing states which
have adopted the zone of danger rule).
65 Falzone, 45 N.J. at 562-66, 214 A.2d at 13-16. The Falzone court noted that the
impact rule articulated in Ward had been the rule in a number ofjurisdictions. Id. at
562, 214 A.2d at 13; see e.g., Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 47 N.E. 88 (Mass. 1897);
Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896); Ewing v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & Saint
Louis Ry., 23 A. 340 (Pa. 1892). The court noted that the existing rule in NewJersey
was that "where there [wa]s no physical impact upon the plaintiff, there can be no
recovery for the bodily injury or sickness resulting from negligently induced fright."
Falzone, 45 N.J. at 561, 214 A.2d at 13.
The Falzone court identified the three reasons advanced in Ward in support of the
requisite impact requirement. Id. at 564-66, 214 A.2d at 15-16. These reasons, the
court noted, included: (1) that physical injury was not the proximate result of emotional harm caused by a negligent act; (2) that because the action in Ward was the first
of its kind in New Jersey, the consensus of the state bar was that no cause of action
existed; and (3) that a flood of litigation would result if the court permitted such
speculative claims. Id.
63
64
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between physical injury and emotional harm.6 6 Advances in the
medical profession, the court opined, had removed the question of
whether a relationship between emotional distress and resultant
physical injuries actually existed.6 7 Second, the court dismissed the
argument that lack of precedent prevents a cause of action from
being established. 68 Finally, the court demonstrated that any personal injury claim requires the jury to engage in the difficult task of
measuring the extent of injury and assessing appropriate damages. 69 This difficulty, the court asserted, does not prevent the
plaintiff from bringing a cause of action for a physical injury claim,
and likewise should not prevent the plaintiff from advancing a
claim for emotional injury. 70 The Falzone court concluded that in
cases where negligence causes fear of physical safety, the plaintiff
may recover when the fright is adequately linked to the physical
injuries or sickness resulting from the emotional distress.71
66 Falzone, 45 N.J. at 563, 564, 214 A.2d at 14. The court discussed the door that
had been left open at times by the judiciary in establishing the connection between
emotional harm and physical injury. Id. at 563-64, 214 A.2d at 14 (citing Bell v. Great
N. Ry., [1889] 26 L.R. Ir. 428, 442 (Ex. Div. 1890)). First, in Bell v. Great Northern
Railway Co., the exchequer division court, allowing recovery for emotional harm absent impact, explained that:
it is impossible for any Court to lay down, as a matter of law, that if
negligence cause[s] fright, and such fright, in its turn, so affects such
structures as to cause injury to health, such injury cannot be 'a consequence which, in the ordinary course of things would flow from the'
negligence, unless such injury 'accompany such negligence in point of
time.'
Bell, [1889] 26 L.R. Ir. at 442. Second, in Spade v. Lynn & Boston Railroad Co., the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts acknowledged that "[g] reat emotion, may,
and sometimes does, produce physical effects." Spade, 47 N.E. at 88. Additionally, the
Faizone court explained that advances in the medical field have established such a
connection. Falzone, 45 N.J. at 564, 214 A.2d at 14.
67 Falzone, 45 N.J. at 564, 214 A.2d at 14.
68 Id. at 565-66, 214 A.2d at 15.
69 Id. at 566, 214 A.2d at 15.
70 Id., 214 A.2d at 15-16. The court emphasized that the "difficulty of proof should
not bar the plaintiff from the opportunity of attempting to convince the trier of fact
of the truth of her claim." Id., 214 A.2d at 16. Additionally, the majority explained
that the court had sufficient safeguards to prevent frivolous claims from flooding the
courts. Id. at 567, 214 A.2d at 16. Such safeguards included the requirement of evidence and sufficiency of evidence rules established by the court. ld. Finally, the court
declared that a flood of litigation of meritorious claims should not be barred. Id.
71 Id. at 569, 214 A.2d at 17. Limiting the holding, the court noted that "where
fright does not cause substantialbodily injury or sickness, it is to be regarded as too
lacking in seriousness and too speculative to warrant the imposition of liability." Id.
The court also defended the departure from precedent by noting that, unlike areas of
property and contract law where "stability and predictability may be crucial," in torts
"there can be little, if any, justifiable reliance" on stare decisis. Id.
Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Torts adopted the zone of danger rule for
recovery of emotional distress. RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, at § 436. See id. for the

1994]

NOTE

Further expanding the right to recover damages for the negligent infliction of emotional distress, the New Jersey Supreme
Court, in Portee v. Jaffee,72 subsequently held that a mother could
sustain a claim for emotional distress suffered from witnessing her
child sustain serious bodily injuries and die, notwithstanding the
fact that she herself was in no risk of danger.7" In Portee, a seven
year old boy became trapped between an elevator's outer door and
the elevator shaft and sustained serious injuries." His mother observed the repeated attempts to rescue the boy, and eventually witnessed his death.7 5 The mother, however, was in no danger as she
watched her son. 76
Justice Pashman, writing for the court, reasoned that the departure from the physical impact requirement articulated in
Falzone should not be interpreted narrowly.77 Instead, the court
observed, many courts have based liability for emotional harm
Restatement's explanation of the rule. One commentator called the zone of danger
rule a "liberal relative of the impact rule." Davies, supra note 1, at 8 n.32.
72 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980).
73 Id. at 91, 101, 417 A.2d at 522-23, 528; see generally Keith Ansbacher, Comment,
Portee v. Jaffee: Dillon Comes to New Jersey, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 1171, 1171 (1981)
(discussing the Portee decision and its adoption of the Dillon standard for bystander
recovery). Prior to Portee, the test applied in New Jersey for negligent infliction of
emotional distress was the fear of safety test adopted in Falzone. Id. at 1173. Mr. Ansbacher noted that the Falzone court never addressed the issue of bystander recovery
and so it was left to Portee. Id. at 1174. See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Falzone decision and the fear of safety test.
74 Portee, 84 N.J. at 91, 417 A.2d at 522-23.
75 Id., 417 A.2d at 523. When the elevator was activated, it dragged the young boy
up three floors, causing him to sustain serious injuries. Id., 417 A.2d at 522. The
boy's mother arrived at the scene immediately thereafter and watched her son wrench
in pain as rescuers attempted to dislodge his body. Id. The mother continued to
observe her son for over four hours, as the rescue attempts continued to fail. Id. The
boy died while he was still trapped in the shaft, his mother a helpless witness. Id., 417
A.2d at 523.
76 Id., 417 A.2d at 522-23.
77 Id. at 93-94, 417 A.2d at 524. The Portee majority, interpreting the Falzone decision, noted that the court required only that the plaintiff suffer substantial bodily
harm from emotional distess, but did not expressly limit recovery to plaintiffs who had
suffered an actual risk of physical harm. Id. The Falzone court emphasized, however,
that where "fright does not cause substantial bodily injury or sickness, it is to be regarded as too lacking in seriousness and too speculative to warrant the imposition of
liability." Falzone, 45 N.J. at 569, 214 A.2d at 17. Justice Proctor, writing for the majority in Falzone, held that "where negligence causes fright from a reasonable fear of
immediate personal injury" and the distress suffered is sufficiently severe, the plaintiff
may recover. Id. Despite Falzone's holding, however, the Portee court interpreted the
decision as not expressly requiring an individual to be in fear of safety to recover. See
Portee,84 N.J. at 93-94, 417 A.2d at 524. In Portee, Justice Pashman's command to not
interpret Faizone narrowly appears to have permitted the court to circumvent the requirement of fear for one's safety. Id.

804

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:788

upon foreseeability.78 Realizing the need to limit tort recovery,
however, the court noted that not all emotional distress would subject a negligent party to liability. 79 Concerned that individuals who
suffer severe emotional distress accompanied by physical manifestations would be unable to recover for the genuine harm suffered,
the court fashioned a four part test to allow recovery.80 The Portee
court articulated that to sustain a cause of action for harm suffered
from emotional distress, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that the
death or serious bodily injury to another was caused by the defendant's negligent conduct; (2) that the relationship between the
plaintiff and the injured party is an intimate familial or marital relationship; (3) the witnessing of the death or serious bodily harm;
and (4) resultant severe emotional distress.81
The New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, in Friel v. Vineland Obstetrical and Gynecological Professional Ass'n, propelled the
evolution of emotional distress claims into the area of obstetrical
medical malpractice.83 The Friel court addressed the issue of
whether a mother could recover for emotional distress suffered
from the fright of the premature birth of her child coupled with
the anxiety of potential developmental problems to the child. 4
78 Portee, 84 N.J. at 94, 417 A.2d at 524. The court, relying on Caputzal v. Lindsay
Co., noted that, historically, questions regarding liability for non-intentional conduct
were governed by duty, breach, and proximate cause of injury. Id. (citing Caputzal v.
Lindsay Co., 48 N.J. 69, 74, 222 A.2d 513, 516 (1966)).
79 Id. at 100-01, 417 A.2d at 528. The court emphasized that it would be unreasonable "[t ] o impose liability for any emotional consequence" emanating from negligent
conduct, and further added that it was equally "unnecessary to protect a plaintiffs
basic emotional stability." Id.
80 Id. at 101, 417 A.2d at 528. Justice Pashman noted:
[N]o loss is greater than the loss of a loved one, and no tragedy is more
wrenching than the helpless apprehension of the death or serious injury of one whose very existence is a precious treasure. The law should
find more than pity for one who is stricken by seeing that a loved one
has been critically injured or killed.
Id. at 97, 417 A.2d at 526.
81 Id. at 101, 417 A.2d at 521. Harm to a plaintiff was foreseeable, under the Portee
test, when the plaintiff "f[ell] within the 'zone of risk.'" Ansbacher, supra note 73, at
1178. According to Mr. Ansbacher, the Portee test begs the question: "whether the
plaintiff's presence as well as his resultant injury [was] foreseeable by the defendant
to place plaintiff within the 'zone of risk.'" Id. at 1178-79. The commentator added
that the adoption of foreseeability as the basis for bystander recovery was a liberal
step. Id. at 1186. This step, explained Mr. Ansbacher, was an improvement to the
zone of danger analysis because it was "more consistent with the basic objective of tort
law-to provide legal redress to persons injured by another person's negligent conduct." Id.
82 166 N.J. Super. 579, 400 A.2d 147 (Law Div. 1979).
83 Id. at 582, 400 A.2d at 148.
84 Id.
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The Friel court held that a mother whose child was prematurely
delivered as a result of medical malpractice was entitled to recover
damages for fright and anxiety sustained by the premature delivery.8 5 Additionally, the court noted that the plaintiff-mother was
permitted to recover for her worry and fear that the child would
not develop normally.8 6 The court acknowledged that in cases of
obstetrical malpractice, the parents of a prematurely delivered and
potentially brain damaged child would be able to recover for their
emotional distress." The majority explained that if negligence was
shown, any emotional distress caused by the fear of potential harm
to the child was recoverable.8 8
The Friel court first pronounced that once the injury to the
child is proved to be the result of medical malpractice, consequential damages for treatment and care are recoverable. 9 Next, the
court distinguished this emotional distress claim from: (1) claims
brought in the case of fright without impact; (2) cases arising out
of injuries suffered by a child in an automobile accident in which
the child was the parent's passenger; and (3) claims brought from
strictly prenatal injuries.9" Finally, the court maintained that the
injuries in the case were suffered by both the mother and the
85 Id. Mrs. Friel experienced bleeding during the 31st week of pregnancy. Id. She
called her doctors, who told her to drink a shot of whiskey and take some aspirin. Id.
Mrs. Friel later visited the doctor who diagnosed her as suffering from a bladder infection, for which medicine was prescribed. Id. The plaintiff, however, continued to
suffer from bleeding and pain, and her physicians repeatedly told her that nothing
was wrong. Id. Finally, after being admitted to the hospital and receiving no assistance from doctors, she delivered the child, who suffered from a number of serious
medical complications. Id. at 583, 400 A.2d at 149.
86 Id. at 582, 400 A.2d at 148.
87 Id.; see also Eleanor Heck, Note, Recovery for Negligent Infliction of EmotionalDistress
in Cases of MedicalMalpractice is Based on Witnessing the Malpractice,Seeing its Effects on the
Patientand Connecting the Malpractice with the Injury, 21 RUrGERS L.J. 719 (1990) (discussing the court's decision in Friel).
88 Friel, 166 N.J. Super. at 587, 400 A.2d at 151.
89 Id. The majority noted that in Brennan v. Biber the trial court observed that "[a]
parent may not recover for injury to his feelings or mental distress" when his child is
injured in a car accident. Id. (quoting Brennan v. Biber, 93 N.J. Super. 351, 365 n.6,
225 A.2d 742, 749 n.6 (Law Div. 1966)). The justice acknowledged that in Smith v.
Brennan, the New Jersey Supreme Court previously had held that no cause of action
existed for the emotional distress suffered by a parent whose child was born with a
deformity. Id. at 588, 400 A.2d 151 (citing Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 364-65, 157
A.2d 497, 503 (1960)). The Friel court noted that a Rhode Island court later extended
the rule to allow recovery for the anxiety and distress suffered before birth. Id. (citing Gagnon v. Rhode Island Co., 101 A. 104 (R-I. 1917)). The Gagnon court explained that a mother "is entitled to damages for her distress and disappointment at
the time of the birth [when,] through the defendant's negligence she [was] deprived
of the right and satisfaction of bearing a sound child ... " Gagnon, 101 A. at 105.
90 Friel, 166 N.J. Super. at 589, 400 A.2d at 152.
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child.9" The Friel court explained that the mother could recover
because the harm was foreseeable. 9 2 The court concluded that the
emotional harm to the parent is equally foreseeable if the injury is
inflicted prenatally.9 3 In addition, observed the court, the emotional harm was recoverable because the obstetrician owed a duty
of care to the mother, which included avoiding exposing the patient to such foreseeable emotional harm.9 4
Halting the further expansion of emotional distress claims
arising out of medical malpractice, the NewJersey Supreme Court,
in Frame v. Kothari,9 5 held that parents could not recover for emotional distress suffered when a physician misdiagnosed the injuries
of their child.9 6 The parents in Frame suffered severe emotional
91 Id. at 590, 400 A.2d at 152. The court relied on Greenberg v. Stanley. Id. (citing
Greenberg v. Stanley, 51 N.J. Super. 90, 143 A.2d 588 (App. Div. 1958)). In Greenberg,
the NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, allowed a young mother to recover
for the psychosomatic disturbances and psychoneurosis she suffered as a result of two
cars jumping the sidewalk where she was pushing her child in a carriage. Greenberg, 51
N.J. Super. at 94, 107-08, 143 A.2d at 590, 596-97. The collision physically injured
Mrs. Greenberg and killed her child. Id. at 93-94, 143 A.2d at 590. The Greenberg
court dismissed the suggestion that the jury awarded damages for the anguish and
distress accompanying the loss of her child, noting that the court had expressly instructed the jury to refrain from doing so. Id. at 105, 143 A.2d at 596-97. Consequently, the majority concluded that the jury's award to Mrs. Greenberg reflected an
appraisal of the emotional distress she suffered from both the accident and the fatal
injury to her child. Id. at 105-06, 143 A.2d at 597. The Greenbergcourt concluded that
both the plaintiffs physical and mental injuries were directly attributable to the accident. Id. Judge Conford explained that Mrs. Greenberg's physical injuries were inextricably intertwined with the distress she suffered due to the death of her child. Id. at
106, 143 A.2d at 598.
92 Friel, 166 N.J. Super. at 592, 400 A.2d at 153.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 591, 400 A.2d at 153. The court, noting that human interest is served by
extending liability to the doctor, explained that "[iut seems sufficiently obvious that
the shock of a mother at danger or harm to her child may be both a real and a serious
injury. All ordinary human feelings are in favor of her action against the negligent
defendant." Id. at 591-92, 400 A.2d at 153 (citations omitted).
95 115 N.J. 638, 560 A.2d 675 (1989). One commentator expressed his surprise at
the court's decision, calling it unlikely because the "Supreme Court of NewJersey [is]
a body that over the years has not been shy about expanding the bounds of liability
....
Paul Reidinger, The DoctorIs In, Courts Limit MalpracticeLiability, 75 A.B.A.J. 112,
112 (Nov. 1989).
96 Frame, 115 N.J. at 640-41, 649, 560 A.2d at 676-77, 681. In Frame,a 10 month-old
child, Arik, fell down the stairs in his home. Id. at 640, 560 A.2d at 676. His parents
took him to a clinic where a doctor examined him. Id. The doctor observed that Arik
had a 102 degree fever and soft spot on his head. Id. The doctor informed Arik's
parents that he had a virus, and instructed them to check Arik's head injury every four
hours. Id. Later that day Arik vomited, and his eyes rolled to the back of his head. Id.
at 640-41, 560 A.2d at 676. His parents became concerned and called the doctor, who
advised them to let Arik sleep for four hours and then wake him. Id. at 641, 560 A.2d
at 677. When the parents later attempted to wake their son, they discovered that he
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distress as a result of a malpractice upon their son that resulted in
his death.9 7 The court identified the threshold issue to be separating the normal grief that accompanies the death of a loved one
from the emotional distress attributable to the fact that the death
was the result of negligence. 98 In answering this question, the
court noted that claims for emotional distress have always been limited-and recovery has only been extended-to claims stemming
from the observation of a traumatic event, not simply its results. 99
The Framecourt concluded, therefore, that the event of misdiagnosis was not the kind of traumatic event necessary to permit recovery
for emotional distress.100 The court noted that an individual is not
likely to immediately observe the results of misdiagnosis and be sufficiently traumatized from the observation. 10 ' Instead, the court
was moribund. Id. Arik's parents proceeded to the hospital where the doctor discovered that he had a blood clot in his skull. Id. Arik died during emergency surgery
that evening. Id.
97 Id. Mrs. Frame suffered from depression and insomnia and was diagnosed by
her physician as having chronic post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. Mrs. Frame attributed this distress to discovering her son in an unconscious state, with his eyes rolling
into the back of his head. Id. Mr. Frame suffered a change in his personality, and
became withdrawn from his family. Id. Seven months following the death of their
son, the Frames separated and divorced, and Mrs. Frame later gave birth to a girl by
another man. Id.
98 Id. at 642, 560 A.2d at 677.
99 Id. The court explained that there is "limited recovery 'to negligent conduct
which strikes at the plaintiffs basic emotional security."' Id. at 643, 560 A.2d at 678
(citation omitted). Therefore, recovery has been permitted only when the "injury
[was] one that [was] susceptible to immediate sensory perception .... " Id. at 644,
560 A.2d at 678.
100 Id. at 647-48, 560 A.2d at 680. The court observed, however, that "[iun an appropriate case, if a family member witnesses the physician's malpractice, observes the
effect of the malpractice on the patient and immediately connects the malpractice
with the injury," a different result may follow. Id. at 649, 560 A.2d at 681. The majority further recognized the arbitrariness of drawing such lines for recovery, but noted
that the court's task is to balance the right to recovery against placing too great a
burden on the medical profession. Id.
101 Id. at 647-48, 560 A.2d at 680. The court distinguished the facts of this case
from a recent California decision, in which the Supreme Court of California permitted a mother to recover for emotional distress resulting from her personal observation of a doctor's misdiagnosis and the harm that followed. Id. at 648-50, 560 A.2d at
680-81 (citing Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1985)). The Frame court
explained that it was the plaintiff's contemporaneous observations of the misdiagnosis
and injury, as well as her understanding that one had caused the other, that permitted recovery in Ochoa. Id. at 649, 560 A.2d at 680-81 (interpreting Ochoa, 703 P.2d at
8).
In Ochoa, a 13 year-old juvenile was admitted to a juvenile detention facility in
Santa Clara County, California. Ochoa, 703 P.2d at 3. The child became ill and underwent treatment at the facility's infirmary. Id. A doctor informed the juvenile that he
had a "bug." Id. The child repeatedly complained to his mother about his illness,
and his mother observed the continually deteriorating condition of her son. Id. The
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is likely only to observe the aftermath or
surmised, an individual
10 2
result of malpractice.
Continuing to limit the circumstances under which successful
emotional distress claims can be brought, the court in Lindenmuth
v. Alperin0' held that misdiagnosis or malpractice was not an event
witnessed by parents, and thus emotional distress was not recoverable for failure to satisfy the Portee "observation of injury" element.1" 4 In Lindenmuth, the plaintiff delivered a baby boy who died
three days later as a result of an intestinal obstruction that was
neither diagnosed nor treated. 0 5 The court, following the lead of
the California judiciary, declared that a claim could only be established when the distress suffered by the plaintiff stemmed from observing the results of the misdiagnosis, not the act of misdiagnosis
mother requested that her son be allowed to go to a private doctor, but her requests
were refused. Id. Finally, she was told that she was not permitted to stay with her son
in the juvenile facility, and was forced to leave him. Id. at 3-4. Thejuvenile died after
she left. Id. at 4.
The Ochoa court applied the Dillon test to permit recovery for negligent infliction
of emotional distress. Id. at 4-5. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the California approach to bystander recovery. The primary concern of
the Ochoa court was whether, under Dillon, the injury observed had to be "the result of
a brief and sudden occurrence .... " Ochoa, 703 P.2d at 6. Although noting that the
sudden occurrence requirement had been followed in other decisions, the Ochoa
court stated that such a requirement has an unwarranted restriction and "arbitrarily
limit[ed] liability when there [wa]s a high degree of foreseeability of shock to the
plaintiff and the shock flows from an abnormal event. . .

."

Id. at 6-7. Instead, the

Ochoa court emphasized the need to be flexible in applying the Dillon factors. Id. at 7.
The majority endorsed a flexible application of the Dillon standard to the facts of the
case because the plaintiff observed the defendant's conduct and was simultaneously
aware that such conduct resulted in injury to her son. Id. at 8. Nevertheless, however,
the court asserted that the plaintiff did not state a cause of action for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress as a direct victim under Molien v. Kaiser Foundation
Hospitals. Id. at 10 (citing Molien, 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980)).
In Molien, the Supreme Court of California permitted a husband to maintain a
cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress when a doctor misdiagnosed his wife with syphilis. Molien, 616 P.2d at 814-15. The Ochoa court observed
that, unlike Molien where negligence was directed at both the husband and the wife,
the negligence in the case at bar was only directed at the juvenile. Ochoa, 703 P.2d at
10. See generally John L. Ropiequet, Emotional Distress Claims in Medical Malpractice
Cases, IIJ. LEGAL MED. 569, 569 (1990) (discussing the Californiajudiciary's handling
of emotional distress claims arising out of medical malpractice injuries).
102 Frame, 115 N.J. at 648, 560 A.2d at 680. One commentator lamented that the
Frame decision was indeed problematic because it indicated a movement by the New
Jersey courts "toward [s] a morass of inconsistent and arbitrary decisions in emotional
distress medical malpractice cases ...

."

Heck, supra note 87, at 734.

197 N.J. Super. 385, 484 A.2d 1316 (Law Div. 1984).
Id. at 386, 389, 484 A.2d at 1318; see supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Portee decision and bystander test for recovery of negligent
infliction of emotional distress.
105 Lindenmuth, 197 N.J. Super. at 386, 484 A.2d at 1316.
103
104
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itself.1" 6 Thus, the Lindenmuth court refused ,to extend Portee to allow recovery for emotional distress absent observation of the negli10 7
gent act.
Redefining the type of harm that parents of a child who is the
victim of medical malpractice suffer, the court in Giardina v. Bennett 0 8 addressed whether parents could recover for emotional
harm suffered as a result of medical malpractice that led to the
stillbirth of their child."0 9 The court characterized the medical
106 Id. at 389, 484 A.2d at 1318. The court, noting the absence of NewJersey precedent, relied on two California decisions. Id. at 387-89, 484 A.2d at 1317-18 (citing
Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Ctr., 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (Ct. App. 1973) andJustus
v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1977)).
In Jansen, the California Court of Appeals denied recovery to a mother for emotional distress suffered after witnessing her daughter's health deteriorate due to the
failure of a hospital to properly diagnose her gastrointestinal hemorrhage. Jansen,
106 Cal. Rptr. at 884. Explaining why the observation requirement had not been met,
the court stated that the failure of a diagnosis is not an event itself perceived by a
layman. Id. at 885.
Similarly, in Justus, the California Supreme Court later denied recovery to a father for emotional distress suffered when his wife delivered a stillborn baby caused by
a doctor's negligence. Justus, 565 P.2d at 122. The father was present in the delivery
room at the time of birth. Id. at 135. The Justuscourt denied recovery to the father
because he had failed to witness the negligent acts of the doctor, and was not aware of
the child's condition until he was notified of the condition by the doctor. Id. at 136.
The majority in Lindenmuth concluded that the facts presented were similar to the
facts of Justus and Jansen, and therefore likewise denied recovery. Lindenmuth, 197
N.J. Super. at 389, 484 A.2d at 1318.
107 Lindenmuth, 197 N.J. Super. at 389, 484 A.2d at 1318-19. The majority noted
that the appellate court, in Eyrich for Eyrich v. Dam, had recently refused to extend
Portee. Id. (citing Eyrich for Eyrich v. Dam, 193 N.J. Super. 244, 473 A.2d 539 (App.
Div. 1984), certif. denied, 97 N.J. 583, 483 A.2d 127 (1984)). The court in Eyrich held
that a neighbor, who had observed a young child being mauled by a circus leopard,
but did not herself participate in any rescue attempts, could not recover for emotional distress. Eyrich, 193 N.J. Super. at 247, 261, 473 A.2d at 540-41, 548. Observing
that the Portee court predicated a decision on the notion that "no loss is greater than
the loss of a loved one," the Eyrich majority declined to extend recovery to the neighbor. Id. at 259, 473 A.2d at 547 (quoting Portee v.Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 97, 417 A.2d 521,
526 (1980)). Admittedly, the Eyrich court recognized that the psychological impact of
the event was "no less foreseeable than the parents' grief' but remarked that "an
intermediate appellate court [is] bound by the decisions of [the] highest court." Id.
108 111 N.J. 412, 545 A.2d 139 (1988).
109 Id. at 413-14, 545 A.2d at 139-40. In Giardina, the plaintiff, Regina Giardina,
became pregnant in October of 1982. Id. at 414, 545 A.2d at 140. She grew increasingly concerned about the well-being of her unborn child after her due date passed,
and was given a non-stress test. Id. The attending physicians assured her that she and
the baby were fine. Id. For the next two weeks, while she experienced pain and contractions, her doctors continually assured her to be patient and told her that a Caesarian Section was unnecessary. Id. On the 12th of June, Mrs. Giardina went to the
hospital with her contractions three minutes apart. Id. No fetal heart rate was found,
and the doctor administered a drug to induce labor. Id. The following morning, she
delivered a stillborn. Id.

810

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:788

malpractice as a direct infliction of harm upon the parents."10 Due
to the extent of emotional harm suffered, and the foreseeability
that such harm was likely to occur, the court recognized that the
malpractice created direct injury to the parents of the child; therefore, the parents could recover for the harm suffered.'
Against this backdrop of the evolution of emotional distress
claims arising out of medical malpractice, the New Jersey Supreme
Court, in Carey v. Lovett,'1 2 once again confronted the issue of
whether an actionable claim for emotional distress existed." 3 Justice Pollock, writing for the majority, began the analysis by examining the historical development of emotional distress claims in New
110 Id. at 415, 545 A.2d at 140. The court explained that the stillbirth constitutes a
direct injury to both the mother and her fetus. Id. The mother, the court explained,
will suffer emotional distress notwithstanding the fact that she may not sustain any
permanent injuries. Id. Similarly, the court concluded that the father would suffer
from emotional distress. Id. The court emphasized that the "injury suffered by the
mother and father on the stillbirth of their eagerly expected first child is palpable and
predictable" and thus determined that a direct claim existed for both the mother and
the father. Id. Relying on Schroeder v. Perke4 the Giardina court noted:
The foreseeability of injury to members of a family other than one immediately injured by the wrongdoing of another must be viewed in light
of the legal relationships among family members. A family is woven of
the fibers of life; if one strand is damaged, the whole structure may
suffer. The filaments of family life, although individually spun, create a
web of interconnected interests.
Id. at 416, 545 A.2d at 141 (quoting Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 63-64, 432 A.2d
834, 839 (1981)).
111 Id. at 417, 545 A.2d at 141. The court explained that the essence of these types
of tortious injuries inheres in family relationships. Id. at 415, 545 A.2d at 140. The
Giardinacourt explored several New Jersey precedents to conclude that the malpractice caused a direct injury to both parents. Id. at 416-20, 545 A.2d at 141-43.
Such precedent included Berman v. Allan, in which the court held that parents
could recover for their emotional distress when their child was born with mongolism,
where medical malpractice had prevented the parents from discovering that the child
would be born with such a defect. Berman, 80 NJ. 421, 423-24, 434, 404 A.2d 8, 10, 15
(1979). In Berman, the doctor's negligence denied the parents the option to abort
the fetus, and therefore was a direct injury to the parents. Id. at 433, 404 A.2d at 14.
Likewise, in Schroeder v. Perke4 when a doctor failed to diagnose a child with cystic
fibrosis, and as a result the parents had a second child who also had the disease, the
court concluded that injury to other family members was foreseeable under the circumstances. Schroeder, 87 NJ. 53, 57-58, 65, 432 A.2d 834, 836, 839 (1981).
Upon reviewing the case law, the Giardinacourt concluded that recovery was permissible because of the fairness of extending such a duty, the genuineness and severity of the claim, and the legitimacy of a claim advanced by expectant parents.
Giardina,111 NJ. at 419, 545 A.2d at 142. The right to recover for emotional distress
under these circumstances, explained the court, "spring[s] from and depend[s] on
the strength of family ties. .
112
113

...

" Id.

132 NJ. 44, 622 A.2d 1279 (1993).
Id. at 49, 622 A.2d at 1281.
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Jersey, distinguishing direct from indirect duty claims.' 14 The
court recognized that under limited circumstances, individuals
who suffered emotional distress as a result of witnessing medical

malpractice upon a family member might sustain a cause of action
1 15
for emotional distress.
The majority next explained that characterizing a claim as direct or indirect served to limit the claimants who might successfully

bring an action for emotional distress. 6 Recognizing the limitations of such categories, the court declared that the principles underlying the claims, rather than the classification of the claims as
either direct or indirect, should determine the rights of claim114 Id. at 55-58, 622 A.2d at 1284-86. The court noted that the Careys' claim for
emotional distress relied on cases that had been decided as direct duty claims. Id. at
55, 622 A.2d at 1284-85. This direct duty standard, the court explained, allowed parents to recover for emotional distress suffered in wrongful birth cases. Id., 622 A.2d at
1285; see, e.g., Berman, 80 N.J. at 423-24, 433-34, 404 A.2d at 10, 14-15 (permitting
parents to recover for emotional distress suffered when their child was born with
Downs Syndrome, and the attending physician failed to inform the parents of the
availability of a test to determine if the child would be born with such a defect, thus
depriving the parents of the choice of terminating the pregnancy). Similarly, observed the court, this direct duty standard permitted recovery for emotional distress
resulting from medical malpractice that caused a stillborn. Carey, 132 N.J. at 55, 622
A.2d 1285. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Giardina. The court added that a direct duty has also been recognized in cases regarding the mishandling of a family member's corpse. Carey, 132 N.J. at 55, 622 A.2d
at 1285; see, e.g., Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., 109 N.J. 523, 526-28,
538, 538 A.2d 346, 347-48, 353. (1988) (recognizing parents' right to recover for emotional harm resulting from a hospital's failure to release their son's corpse).
The Carey court distinguished the direct duty cases, upon which the plaintiffs
relied, from indirect duty claims. Carey, 132 N.J. at 55-56, 622 A.2d at 1285. The court
next explored the history of indirect duty claims. Id. at 56, 622 A.2d at 1285. Initially,
the courts denied indirect duty claims under all circumstances. Id.; see, e.g., Graf v.
Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 304, 311, 204 A.2d 140, 141, 145 (1964) (denying recovery for
emotional distress suffered by parents under the wrongful death statute, after their
child was stillborn). The Carey court noted that later courts began to allow recovery
for emotional harm suffered absent physical injury when the plaintiff: witnessed an
injury to a family member, was at the scene of the accident, and suffered severe distress as a result. Carey, 132 N.J. at 57, 622 A.2d at 1285; see, e.g., Buckley v. Trenton
Sav. Fund Soc'y, 111 N.J. 355, 357, 368, 544 A.2d 857, 859, 864 (1988) (denying recovery for emotional distress suffered as a result of wrongful dishonor of checks because
the emotional distress was not sufficiently severe).
115 Carey, 132 N.J. at 56, 622 A.2d at 1285. The court explained that "death or
serious injury of a family member may often produce emotional distress, sometimes

quite severe, in another member .

. . ."

Id.

Id. The court explored the evolution of such claims, tracing the claims' development from early cases denying recovery absent physical impact, to later cases permitting recovery notwithstanding lack of physical contact. Id. at 56-57, 622 A.2d at
1285. Finally, the court restated the holding in Portee v. Jaffee, which permitted recovery of a mother who witnessed her son trapped in an elevator shaft and die. Id. (citing Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 101, 417 A.2d 521, 528 (1980)).
116
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ants. 117 Discussing the scope of a duty in family tort law, Justice
Pollock noted that the foreseeability of consequences defines the
parameters of the duty in this area.1 18 Included in the foreseeable
consequences, stated the court, is harm suffered by one family
member when another member has been injured. 9 Noting the
concerns regarding spurious claims for emotional distress, the
court identified certain limitations placed upon indirect duty
claims.12 0 Finally, the majority maintained that to recover for emotional distress arising out of medical malpractice, such claimants
12 1
must observe both the malpractice and the injury that results.
Acknowledging that injury to a child is likely to cause emotional trauma to the child's parents, the court admitted it was not
concerned with the genuineness of claims brought by parents
under these circumstances, but rather with the impact upon society
and the medical profession once the courts broaden the scope of
liability.1 2 2 Beginning with Mrs. Carey's claim for emotional distress, the court determined that the relationship between a mother
and her fetus so unite them that a mother cannot be viewed simply
as a bystander.1 2 3 Because the emotional and physical ties between
the mother and her unborn child are so great, the court concluded, the impact of any emotional harm resulting from malpractice is immediate.1 24 The relationship existing between the mother
and her child, stated the court, effectively eliminates the distinc117 Id. at 57, 622 A.2d at 1286. Recalling the court's decision in Giardina,which
permitted recovery to parents bringing a claim for emotional distress resulting from
the stillbirth of their child, the court stated that "circumstances assure the genuineness of the resulting emotional injury and mental anguish." Id., 622 A.2d at 1285-86
(quoting Giardina v. Bennett, 111 N.J. 412, 420, 545 A.2d 139, 143 (1988)). As did
the Court in Giardina, the Carey court concluded that the circumstances will determine if a claim is one arising from a direct duty. Id., 622 A.2d at 1286.
118 Id. (citation omitted). The court, however, again noted that policy considerations and fairness concerns limit the determination of the foreseeability of consequences. Id. at 58, 622 A.2d at 1286.
119 Id.
120 Id. The court stated that claims for emotional distress have been limited to
recovery in situations in which the "distress [wa]s severe or [wa]s accompanied by
physical injury." Id. These limitations, the court explained, are a result of the concerns over the genuineness of indirect emotional distress claims. Id. The limitations
of observation of the act and observation of the result of medical malpractice, the
court observed, serve similar purposes for medical malpractice claims. Id.
121

Id.

Id.
Id. at 59, 622 A.2d at 1286. See supra notes 8-12 and 64-81 for a discussion of
bystander recovery for emotional distress.
124 Carey, 132 N.J. at 59, 622 A.2d at 1286. The court asserted; "[u]nlike parents
who have time to adjust between an act of malpractice on their child and a resultant
injury, the expectant mother's distress is immediate." Id., 622 A.2d at 1286-87.
122
123
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tion between direct and indirect claims 2 5 Justice Pollock added
that the relationship between a mother and child further removes
the concern that emotional distress be genuine, and insisted that
the requirement of severity is enough of a limitation on
126
recovery.
Continuing to relax the standard of recovery for mothers, the
court removed the requirement of observation of the malpractice. 127 The majority bolstered this decision by explaining that the
use of anesthesia in the labor process makes the observation requirement impractical. 121 Similarly, the justice eliminated the requirement that a mother prove that she had been shocked by the
event, explaining that a mother would naturally be shocked that
129
her child was a stillborn.
Following this treatment of the mother's claim for emotional
distress, the court began an analysis of the father's claim. 130 The
court first declared that the considerations present in a father's
claim for emotional distress differ from a mother's claim.13 1 The
extension of the duty of care to the father, the court explained,
must lie in the type of relationship the father had with the victim
and the mother.1 1 2 As a result of the inherent differences in the
role of a mother and a father, the court concluded that a father
ought not benefit from the relaxed standard of recovery annunciated by the court for a mother.13' The majority pronounced,
therefore, that the father must observe the malpractice and the re125 Id., 622 A.2d at 1287. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of indirect versus direct duty claims.
126 Carey, 132 N.J. at 59, 622 A.2d at 1287. The majority stated that "[t]he maternalfetal relationship bespeaks the genuineness of an otherwise-valid claim for emotional
distress." Id.
127 Id. at 60, 622 A.2d at 1287.
128 Id. The court expressed concern with the requirement that the mother witness
the malpractice. Id. This concern, the court noted, stemmed from the use of anesthesia during the labor process. Id. The court believed that if the fulfillment of such
a requirement were a demand, many doctors would have an incentive to anesthetize
women to prevent them from observing any medical malpractice. Id.
129 Id. The court maintained that the shock requirement served no useful purpose.
Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. The court insisted that "[n]o matter how intimately involved in the birth of
his child the father may be, his role differs from that of the mother." Id.
132 Id. (citation omitted). The majority explained that the father's recovery will
often turn upon whether he stands in an "intimate family relationship to the mother
and [the] baby [and whether] ... the father is drawn sufficiently into the treatment of
the mother and the baby .... Id. In such cases, the court surmised, the duty owed
to the father will be similar to that owed to the mother. Id.
133 Id., 622 A.2d at 1287-88.

814

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:788

sultant injuries, as well as demonstrate that he was shocked by the
injuries.1 1 4 Justice Pollock next discussed the duty that existed between the father and the mother's obstetrician, noting that the father did not benefit from the duty that attaches in a doctor-patient
relationship.1 3 5
Summarizing the treatment of the parents' claims, and emphasizing the two different standards for parental recovery of emotional distress arising out of medical malpractice,1 3 6 the court held
that for a mother to recover, she must demonstrate that her distress was severe. 1 37 The justice articulated that severity of distress is
measured by the presence of physical manifestations or a destruction of the mother's emotional security.13 8 Conversely, the court
propounded, a father will be denied recovery unless he can prove
severe distress, observation of malpractice and its effects, and the
presence of shock. 139 Due to the trial court's failure to include the
latter two requirements necessary for paternal recovery within the
jury charge, the supreme court ruled that the trial court's charge
was erroneous. 140 Moreover, the court noted that the record indi14 1
cated that the father satisfied this standard.
Cognizant of the fact that claims such as the Careys' would
tend to invite an emotional response, the court emphasized the
need for trial courts to remain impartial in adjudicating such
claims. 142 After reviewing the record below, the majority, agreeing
with the appellate division, held that the trial judge had not re134 Id., 622 A.2d at 1288.
135 Id. at 60-61, 622 A.2d at 1287. The duty of reasonable care is more stringent in a
doctor-patient relationship. HENDERSON & PEARSON, supra note 6, at 405. In medical

malpractice cases, Professors Henderson and Pearson have stated, "professional custom ... is the standard of care." Id.; see generally Richard N. Pearson, The Role of Custom
in Medical Malpractice Cases, 51 IND. L.J. 528, 528 (1976) (discussing the standard of
care doctors owe to their patients). The Carey court, however, maintained that the
absence of this doctor patient relationship "does not necessarily preclude the existence of a duty extending from the physicians to the father." Carey, 132 N.J. at 61, 622
A.2d at 1287.
136 Carey, 132 N.J. at 62, 622 A.2d at 1288.
137 Id.; see supra notes 30-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the physical
manifestations of emotional distress and for a discussion of the severity of the
mother's emotional distress.
138 Carey, 132 N.J. at 62, 622 A.2d at 1288.
139 Id.
140 Id. The recent trend in the courts is to reestablish "bright line rules that look to
precedent to define types of cases in which recovery for emotional distress is permitted." Christopher F. Wilson, Trends in EmotionalDistress Cases, THE CAL. LAw. 63 (Oct.
1991).
141 Carey, 132 N.J. at 62, 622 A.2d at 1288.
142 Id. at 62-63, 622 A.2d at 1288. The court asserted that "[p]recisely because of
the power of such claims to play on the sympathies of others, trial courts must be
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mained impartial during the proceedings and had influenced the
14
jury to return a large award for the Careys. 1
Finally, the court addressed the issue of damages, noting that
although the court's role in reviewing jury awards is limited, it is
indeed necessary. 14 1 Upon reviewing the record, the justice concluded that the jury verdicts, awarding Mrs. Carey $1,000,000 and
Mr. Carey $500,000 for the emotional harm suffered, could not
stand.1 45 The court submitted that such an award could only be
the result of the prejudice, partiality, or passion of the jury.1 4 6 The
majority concluded the discussion of damages by noting that many
sensitive to their obligation to remain impartial when adjudicating those claims." Id.
at 63, 622 A.2d at 1288.
143 Id. at 63-65, 622 A.2d at 1289. The court highlighted some of the examples of
instances in which the trial judge crossed the line into advocating one side of the case
over another. Id. Examples of a trial judge's impartial behavior included: (1) constant intrusions into direct and cross examination of defense counsel witnesses; (2)
permitting an emotional opening statement designed to inflame the jury; (3) heated
exchanges with defense counsel; and (4) refusal to allow the defendant to testify as an
expert. Id. at 63-64, 622 A.2d at 1289.
The Code ofJudicial Conduct lists seven canons that ajudge must follow to comply with the rules of professional conduct. SYLvIA B. PRESSLER,RuLEs GOVERNING THE
COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEWJERSEY, Part 1 app., 299 (1993). The Code provides:
CANON 1 Ajudge should uphold the integrity and independence of the
judiciary
CANON 2 A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities
CANON 3 Ajudge should perform the duties ofjudicial office impartially
and diligently
CANON 4 A judge may engage in activities to improve the law, the legal
system and the administration of justice
CANON 5 A judge should regulate extra-judicial activities to minimize
the risk of conflict with judicial duties
CANON 6 A judge should not receive compensation for quasi-judicial
and extra-judicial activities
CANON 7 A judge should refrain from political activity
Id.
144 Carey, 132 N.J. at 66, 622 A.2d at 1290; see, e.g.,
Taweel v. Starn's Shoprite
Supermkt., 58 N.J. 227, 231, 276 A.2d 861, 863 (1971) (discussing the role of the trial
court in reviewing jury awards). In Tawee, the court explained that the trial judge
should not meddle with the jury's assessment of damages unless "it is so disproportionate to the injuries ...

as to shock [the] conscience .

. . ."

Id. at 236, 276 A.2d at

865. See also Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co., 74 NJ. 588, 594, 379 A.2d 225, 228 (1977)
(discussing the role of the appellate court in reviewing jury awards). The Baxter court
noted that the criteria for an appellate court to interfere with a jury's assessment of
damages is the same as in the trial court. Id. at 596, 379 A.2d at 229.
145 Carey, 132 N.J. at 66, 622 A.2d at 1290. Similarly, the court found excessive the
jury's award of $550,000 for the baby's pain and suffering experienced during her 10
day life, and the award of $450,000 wrongful death claim of the baby, holding that the
wrongful death statute does not provide for such recovery under these circumstances.
Id. at 67, 622 A.2d at 1290-91.
146 Id., 622 A.2d at 1290.
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states have enacted legislation that places a cap on the recovery
available from medical malpractice claims.1 47 Stressing that the decision to create such caps was best left to the legislature, the court
refused to rule on the constitutionality of such statutes. 4 ' Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the appellate court,
which dismissed the Careys' claim for emotional distress, and remanded the case to the law division for adjudication on liability
9
and damages.

14

Although concurring in the decision, Justice Handler disagreed with both the majority's characterization of the mother's
claim as a bystander and the requirement that the mother suffer
severe distress to recover damages.' 50 Justice Handler emphasized
that the mother's claim stemmed from the fact that she was a patient. 51 Differing from the majority's opinion, the concurring justice suggested that the presence of emotional injury, rather than
the right of recovery, should determine the amount of damages.152
147 Id. at 68-69, 622 A.2d at 1291-92. The following states have adopted caps for
damage awards from medical malpractice: Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado,
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New
Mexico, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. (citations
omitted).
148 Id. at 70, 622 A.2d at 1292. The majority emphasized that the court did not set
forth any view on the wisdom or constitutionality of such statutes. Id. Instead, the
majority articulated, the role of the court is one of "defining the contours of a common-law claim in the absence of legislative guidance." Id.
149

Id.

Id. at 70-71, 622 A.2d at 1292-93 (Handler, J., concurring) Justice Handler declared that "the fairness and decency of recognizing a duty of care directly ow[ed] to
the mother is obvious beyond any doubt in this setting." Id., 622 A.2d at 1292 (Handler, J., concurring).
151 Id. at 72, 622 A.2d at 1293 (Handler, J., concurring). The concurring justice
stated that he was "puzzled and troubled by the Court's reasoning, which in some
ways relegates the mother to the status of a mere bystander when it is painfully obvious that she herself is the patient." Id. at 71, 622 A.2d at 1293 (Handler, J.,
concurring).
152 Id. at 72, 622 A.2d at 1293 (Handler, J., concurring); see, e.g., Evers v. Dollinger,
95 NJ. 399, 410, 471 A.2d 405, 411 (1984) (holding that a patient should be able to
recover for all damages that are provable, including emotional distress, and which
proximately result from the doctor's negligent actions). In Evers, a patient discovered
a lump in her breast, and was told by her physician, after he had performed an examination, that she was in good health. Id. at 402, 471 A.2d at 407. After her visit, the
doctor informed her to "'stop worrying and go home and relax.'" Id. On a later
occasion, the doctor informed Mrs. Evers that she had an abscess from where a culture had been taken. Id. at 403, 471 A.2d at 407. The doctor repeatedly assured Mrs.
Evers that a biopsy was not appropriate. Id. Several months later, she consulted with
another doctor, who diagnosed Mrs. Evers as having both lung and breast cancer. Id.
at 403-04, 471 A.2d at 407-08. The cancerous cells of the breast had metastasized into
the lung. Id. The plaintiff argued that the original doctor's inaccurate diagnosis and
delay in treatment caused her physical and emotional injuries. Id. at 409, 471 A.2d at
150
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The right to recover, stated Justice Handler, was predicated on the
153
breach of a duty, i.e., the breach of a doctor-patient relationship.
The justice opined that the majority's opinion seemed to be driven
by a concern over the possibility of fraudulent claims, which was an
1 4
issue not present in the record below.
The concurring opinion next addressed the majority's treatment of the father's claim for emotional distress as a claim of an
indirect duty owed to the father. 155 Justice Handler again disagreed with the majority's casting of the father as a bystander, especially when the father had participated in the preparation of the
birth. 156 The concurrence concluded, therefore, that the doctor
1 57
owed both the father and the mother a direct duty of care.
The history and development of emotional distress claims
demonstrate a painstaking attempt by the court to balance two prevailing interests of tort law.' 5 8 The New Jersey courts have worked
to reconcile two competing interests: (1) the plaintiff's right to
recover for harm suffered and (2) the need to limit the extension
of a defendant's liability for his negligent acts. 159 The courts have
411. Mrs. Evers suffered from insomnia, weight gain, and fatigue, as well as periodic
pain and a twitch in her eye. Id. She claimed that her distress stemmed from the
"unrelieved state of anxiety and fear over the growing, untreated tumor, as well as her
anger and hostility towards [the] defendant after her tumor was finally diagnosed."
Id. at 409-10, 471 A.2d at 411.
The Evers court allowed the plaintiff to present claims for mental anguish resulting from medical malpractice, because mental pain and suffering were compensable
medical malpractice injuries. Id. at 410, 471 A.2d at 411. The court cited several cases
supporting the conclusion that emotional distress claims arising out of medical malpractice had long been recognized. Id. at 410-11, 471 A.2d at 411 (citations omitted).
The court explained that emotional distress claims are just as real as claims for physical injuries. Id. at 410, 471 A.2d at 411. Bolstering the conclusion, the court opined
that emotional distress could include concerns over the future consequences of the
malpractice. Id.
153 Carey, 132 N.J. at 72, 622 A.2d at 1293 (Handler, J., concurring).
154 Id. at 72-73, 622 A.2d at 1293 (Handler, J., concurring).
Justice Handler
stressed that any such concerns were not at issue in the present case. Id. at 73, 622
A.2d at 1294 (Handler, J., concurring). The justice asserted that "[f]ar clearer than
the bases for these concerns is that in cases of this kind, the injury to the mother is
patent and palpable." Id., 622 A.2d at 1294 (Handler, J., concurring).
155

Id.

Id. at 73-74, 622 A.2d at 1294 (Handler, J., concurring). Justice Handler explained that "[tio characterize the father's status in this context as a 'bystander' is to
miscast the role of the father and the responsibility of the doctor to the family." Id. at
74, 622 A.2d at 1294 (Handler, J., concurring)
156

157

Id.

See Kelleher, supra note 64, at 1323. Kelleher observed that the courts must
balance several factors, including: "(1) the need for compensation, (2) precedent,
(3) defendant's culpability, (4) convenience of administration, (5) the parties' capacity to bear the loss, and (6) deterrence." Id.
159 See Ropiequet, supranote 101, at 569. One commentator explained that tort law
158
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steadily expanded both the plaintiff's right to recover for emotional distress and, consequently, extended the defendant's scope
of liability. 6 °
The NewJersey Supreme Court's most recent extension of recovery, allowing parents to recover for emotional distress in the
area of medical malpractice, has raised some troubling issues.
Most significantly, and perhaps most problematic, is the categoriza16 1
tion of the harm suffered by parents under these circumstances.
This categorization is critical because it is determinative of the standard a plaintiff needs to satisfy to sustain a cause of action for emotional distress.' 62 Namely, the classification of harm as a direct
injury to the parents will permit recovery absent a showing that the
parent observed the malpractice. 163 The observation requirement,
however, remains a necessary element for recovery under the Portee
standard if the harm is classified as an indirect injury. 64 As noted
by the Carey court, this observation requirement is virtually impossible to satisfy.' 65
The majority of the Carey court dismissed the importance of
these categories and attempted to circumvent the problems of dihas been the "product of two conflicting forces." Id. at 598. Courts have historically
been suspicious of claims for purely mental injury. Id. Courts, however, have accepted the fact that traumatic events do cause real harm, notwithstanding a lack of
physical impact or injury. Id. at 599. The result has been that "courts want deserving
plaintiffs to be compensated, but only in appropriate cases." Id.
160 See supra notes 1-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history of
emotional distress claims in the United States.
161 See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the direct
verses indirect claims for emotional distress recovery.
162 See Frame v. Kothari, 115 N.J. 638, 650, 560 A.2d 675, 681 (1989) (characterizing
the harm suffered by parents as an indirect injury and subsequently denying recovery
to the parents for failure to meet the observation requirement for recovery); see also
Giardina v. Bennett, 111 NJ. 412, 413, 545 A.2d 139, 139 (1988) (characterizing the
harm suffered by parents as a direct injury, and permitting recovery for emotional
distress notwithstanding the fact that the parents may not have observed the malpractice that resulted in the stillbirth of their expected child).
163 See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Giardina
case.
164 See supra note 81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Potee test for
bystander recovery. See also supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Frame decision, and the court's characterization of the harm suffered as
indirect. The court, in Frame, explained that recovery for such an injury is only permissible when the "injury [is] one that is susceptible to immediate sensory perception
.... " Frame v. Kothari, 115 NJ. 638, 644, 560 A.2d 675, 678 (1989). Misdiagnosis of
injury, the court concluded, was not an event which was susceptible to such immediate perception. Id.
165 See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difficulty
of fulfilling the observation requirement under Potee when emotional distress claims
arise out of medical malpractice.
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rect and indirect harm by articulating separate standards of recovery for mothers and fathers. 66 This dual standard is equally
problematic. First, as the concurrence explains, the categorization
1 67
of the mother's claim as one similar to a bystander is incorrect.
Likening Mrs. Carey's claim to that of a bystander, when she is a
patient, strips her of the heightened standard of care a doctor owes
to his or her patient. 6 Additionally, New Jersey courts have held
that a doctor's duty to his or her patient includes preventing that
patient's exposure to an unreasonable risk of not only physical, but
also emotional, harm. 6 9 For example, in Evers v. Dollinger,170 the
court recognized that medical malpractice claims included recovery for the anxiety and stress often associated with the patient who
is a victim of medical malpractice.1 7 1 Mrs. Carey's claim should
have been sustained on these grounds, as opposed to a contrived
1 72
notion that her claim was akin to that of a bystander.
Secondly, the creation of the observation requirement, as a
prerequisite for the father to recover, prevents recovery to many
who might otherwise bring meritorious claims.1 7 1 Under many circumstances, the act of malpractice itself may be difficult to
pinpoint. Thus, a lay person may be unaware of when malpractice
is occurring. It is particularly difficult for a father to meet this ob166 Carey v. Lovett, 132 NJ. 44, 62, 622 A.2d 1279, 1288 (1993). The majority explained that "[t]he characterization of a claim as 'direct' or 'indirect,'... should not
predetermine the rights of the parties." Id. at 57, 622 A.2d at 1286. Forgoing the
categories of direct and indirect injury, the court later articulated different standards
of recovery for mothers and fathers. Id. at 62, 622 A.2d at 1288.
167 Id. at 71, 622 A.2d at 1292-93 (Handler, J., concurring).
168 See Pearson, supra note 135, at 528 (discussing the heightened standard of care
doctors owe to their patients); see also Carey, 132 NJ. at 71, 622 A.2d at 1292-93 (Handler,J., concurring) (discussing the majority's characterization of Mrs. Carey's claim).
169 See, e.g., Evers v. Dollinger, 95 NJ. 399, 410, 471 A.2d 405, 411 (1984) (allowing
plaintiffs to present claims for emotional distress because such claims are compensable medical malpractice claims).
170 95 N.J. 399, 471 A.2d 405 (1984).
171 See supra note 152 for a discussion of the Evers case.
172 See Carey, 132 N.J. at 59, 622 A.2d at 1286. The court explained that a mother
and her child are in some respects interconnected and in other respects separate. Id.
The mother, the majority observed, is "more than a 'bystander.'" Id. The court, however, did not raise Mrs. Carey to the level of a direct claimant, but side-stepped the
issue by stating that "the connection between a mother and her baby so merges 'direct' and 'indirect' claims that the distinction disappears." Id. at 59, 622 A.2d at 1287.
173 See id. at 61, 622 A.2d at 1287. The court, explaining the reason for the different standards of recovery for mothers and fathers, observed that it was "[b]ecause of
the inherent difference in the role of the father and mother" that the father's claim
was subject to certain limitations. Id., 622 A.2d at 1287-88. As a result of these inherent differences, the court stated that the father must "contemporaneously observe the
malpractice and its effects on the victim." Id., 622 A.2d at 1288.
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servation requirement because, if a problem induced by malpractice should arise during labor, the father may be forced to exit the
delivery room, thus destroying any possibility that he could observe
or witness the malpractice. 17 4 Surely an expectant father, forced to
leave the room, suffers tremendous anxiety and distress as he
awaits news of his child's and its mother's prognosis. Observation
of the results of malpractice would seem to be a more fair requirement for recovery.
In balancing the competing interests of tort law, the Carey majority has tipped the scales of justice more favorably for mothers
than for fathers. Although the majority concludes that parents
may recover for emotional distress under these circumstances, the
court has in fact decided that only mothers may recover, and even
then only under a bystander-like theory of recovery. The standard
of recovery for fathers appears virtually impossible to satisfy.
Kimberly A. Flynn

174 Ironically, the majority eliminated the observation requirement for the mother
because of the concern that such a requirement would serve as an incentive for doctors to anesthetize women during their labor, and therefore ensure that no observation was possible. Id., at 60, 622 A.2d at 1287. By insisting on an observation
requirement for fathers, the majority has created an additional incentive to keep expectant fathers out of the delivery room, or at least limit their stay.

